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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND MARKMAN RULINGS: THE CALL 
FOR UNIFORMITY 
C. JOËL VAN OVER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Two recent cases have decided an issue of first impression important to 
patent litigants: whether a trial court’s construction of patent claims pursuant to 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,1 collaterally estops the relitigation of 
the construction of the same patent claims in a subsequent suit.  In TM Patents, 
L.P. v. IBM Corp.,2 the Southern District of New York held that a patentee was 
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating claim 
construction issues determined in an earlier case.  The earlier case settled 
during trial.  In Graco Children’s Products, Inc. v. Regalo International, LLC,3 
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 1. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 2. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  Since this paper 
was written, the court in Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667 (N.D. Ill. 2000), 
followed the reasoning of the TM Patents case, and distinguished the Graco case, holding that an 
earlier claim construction applies against the patentee in a later case where the earlier claim 
construction resulted in a finding of noninfringment.  An interlocutory decision issued by the 
United States District Court for the district of Connecticut on June 4, 2001 in Edberg v. CPI 
International, Inc., No. 3:98CV716(JBA) (Rulings on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment) 
also follows the reasoning of TM Patents, holding that the same court’s earlier claim construction 
was binding upon the plaintiffs even though the earlier action settled before trial.  The author is 
co-counsel for defendant CPI International, Inc. in that case.  The more recent cases noted here 
and infra note 3 further illustrate the divergent positions taken by the courts in TM Patents and 
Graco. 
 3. Graco Children’s Products, Inc. v. Regalo Int’l., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 
1999).  The most recent case to consider the preclusive effect of an earlier Markman ruling, 
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Electric Corp., No. 7:99CV00308, 2001 WL 732012 (W.D. Va. 
July 29, 2001), held that an earlier Markman ruling does not estop the relitigation of claim 
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reached the opposite result.  The Graco 
court held that the claim construction in an earlier case did not preclude 
relitigation of the same claim construction issues.  The earlier case settled 
during an appeal of the trial court’s judgment on a jury verdict finding 
infringement. 
Although neither of these two recent cases fully explores the 
underpinnings of collateral estoppel and the policy implications of applying 
collateral estoppel to Markman rulings, the Federal Circuit will no doubt be 
asked to do so in the near future.  As this Article argues, the Supreme Court 
and the Federal Circuit’s sister circuits would seem to favor the application of 
collateral estoppel to Markman rulings, at least under the circumstances of 
both TM Patents and Graco.  The Federal Circuit, however, has generally 
taken a conservative approach to collateral estoppel and one that would seem 
to support only a restrictive application of collateral estoppel to Markman 
rulings.  If the Federal Circuit is to offer unifying guidance in this area, it must 
take a fresh look at the issue. 
If the Federal Circuit fails to find sufficient policy interests in Supreme 
Court precedent to support a uniform approach to the collateral estoppel effect 
of Markman rulings, the result will be that some circuits mandate collateral 
estoppel effect for Markman rulings in most circumstances, while other circuits 
prohibit collateral estoppel effect in the same circumstances.  Even though the 
Federal Circuit applies the law of the local circuit in reviewing a trial court’s 
application of collateral estoppel,4 the application of this doctrine to Markman 
rulings calls for uniformity.  A split among the circuits on the question of the 
collateral estoppel effect of Markman rulings would almost certainly guarantee 
forum shopping.  More basically, the policy goals of Markman, to promote 
uniformity in claim construction and to provide clear public notice of the 
meaning and scope of the patent grant, arguably would be dealt a severe blow. 
This paper addresses to what extent collateral estoppel can and should be 
invoked in furthering uniformity of claim construction since Markman.  I 
address this issue first within the context of the two recent district court cases 
reaching different results in their application of collateral estoppel to Markman 
rulings.  I then review the Federal Circuit’s historical perspective of collateral 
estoppel and its apparent readiness to reconsider collateral estoppel in light of 
the new Markman regime.  I conclude with a discussion of Supreme Court 
 
construction issues where the earlier case was settled and thus not tested on appeal.  The court in 
the first case denied a motion to vacate its Markman ruling even though settlement was 
conditioned upon vacatur.  Allen-Bradley Co., L.L.C. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316 (E.D. 
Wisc. 2001). 
 4. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co.  v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1381 n.4 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
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precedent and policy issues and suggest, as I do throughout, that collateral 
estoppel should apply to Markman rulings as broadly as “fairness” permits.5 
II.  TM PATENTS AND GRACO 
The courts in both TM Patents and Graco recognized that Markman 
creates new issues concerning the collateral estoppel effects of Markman 
rulings on subsequent claim construction.6  As the TM Patents court explained: 
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s ruling [in Markman] in 1995, disputes concerning 
the meaning of patent claims were submitted to a jury along with questions 
about validity and infringement.  Thus, until there was a final judgment after a 
jury verdict, there was no construction of claims [citation omitted], and hence, 
no finality for collateral estoppel purposes.  However, after Markman, claim 
construction became a separate legal issue, for determination by the Court . . . .  
The jury is not free to override the Court’s construction of the disputed terms.  
It is hard to see how much more “final” a determination could be.7 
While the TM Patents court was ultimately persuaded that the new 
Markman regime was decisive in expanding the role of collateral estoppel in 
claim construction matters, the Graco court was not.  Before evaluating the 
respective merits of these apparently divergent decisions, it is first necessary to 
understand the issues presented to each court and each court’s respective 
analysis of these issues. 
A. TM Patents 
The issue presented in TM Patents was whether a trial court’s earlier 
Markman ruling was binding on the patent holder in a second case where the 
earlier case settled during trial.  The court in TM Patents applied a four-part 
test to determine whether a prior Markman ruling precluded relitigation of 
claim construction issues in a subsequent case.8  The elements of this test are: 
First, the issues raised in both proceedings must be identical.  Second, the 
relevant issues must have actually been litigated and decided in the prior 
proceeding.  Third, the party to be estopped must have had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issues in that prior proceeding.  And fourth, 
resolution of the issues must have been necessary to support a valid and final 
judgment on the merits.9 
The parties in TM Patents agreed that the first and third prongs of the test 
had been met.  They disagreed on the second and fourth prongs.  The court 
 
 5. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323 (1971). 
 6. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376; Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 662-63. 
 7. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
 8. Id. at 375. 
 9. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Emprea Naviera Santa S.A., 56 F.3d 
359, 368 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
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found that the issue of finality (the fourth element) “subsumed” the question of 
whether the issue had actually been decided in the prior case (the second 
element).10  Thus, the critical issue for the court was whether a Markman 
ruling could be considered “final” when the dispute over the meaning of claim 
terms was never reduced to final judgment “because the matter was settled 
before the jury had returned its verdict on the question of infringement.”11  TM 
Patents argued that if there is no final, appealable judgment, there can be no 
“finality” for collateral estoppel purposes.12 
The court flatly rejected this argument: “Unfortunately for TM, that is not 
the law in this Circuit (or any other, for that matter).”13  The court relied on 
Judge Friendly’s “seminal opinion” in Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil 
Refining Co.14 In that opinion Judge Friendly explained that finality for 
purposes of collateral estoppel is not the same as finality under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291, which speaks only to finality for purposes of appeal.15  The Lummus test 
for finality in the collateral estoppel context, rather, depends upon 
such factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly 
tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review. . . . 
‘Finality’ in the context [of collateral estoppel] may mean little more than that 
the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no 
really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.16 
Relying upon a later decision decided under Lummus, the court pointed out that 
interlocutory orders, such as summary judgment decisions, may estop 
relitigation of issues decided by summary judgment.17  Thus, collateral 
estoppel “does not require a ‘judgment which ends the litigation . . . and leaves 
nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment’ . . . but includes 
many dispositions which, although not final in that sense, have nevertheless 
been fully litigated.”18 
The TM Patents court had no difficulty in holding, under the teachings of 
Lummus and its progeny, that the patent holder was foreclosed from 
relitigating the meaning of claim limitations decided in the previous case’s 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375. 
 13. Id. 
 14. 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962). 
 15. Id. at 89. 
 16. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (quoting Lummus, 297 F.2d at 89). 
 17. Id. at 376 (citing Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981)). 
 18. Id. at 376 (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 
955 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (holding a decision on liability that is affirmed on appeal is 
entitled to collateral estoppel effect even though damages phase of trial not complete and no 
judgment entered)). 
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Markman ruling.19  In reaching this conclusion the court found that under the 
new Markman regime, courts typically require the parties to litigate claim 
construction disputes prior to trial so that the court can instruct the jury on the 
meaning of the patent prior to trial.20  “Moreover, the Court limits itself to 
construing that which is necessary to the resolution of the questions of 
infringement and validity.”21  As the jury is “not free to override the Court’s 
construction of disputed terms, [i]t is hard to see how much more ‘final’ a 
determination could be.”22 
Concerning whether the parties were entitled to a “full and fair hearing,” 
the court found that the prior district court conducted a two-day Markman 
hearing, heard evidence, and issued a thorough ruling.  The court then accepted 
further briefing and heard re-argument and made modifications to its ruling.23  
The ruling was a fully litigated determination.24  Concerning finality, the court 
then instructed the jury on the ruling and gave each juror a copy of the 
instruction to guide them during the course of trial.  As the TM Patents court 
found, “[a] verdict would not have changed anything about [the] Markman 
rulings.  Nothing more remained to be adjudicated; nothing more remained to 
be decided on the issue of claim construction.”25 
The TM Patents court concluded that 
[a]fter Markman, with its requirement that the Court construe the patent for the 
jury as a matter of law, it is inconceivable that a fully-litigated determination 
after a first Markman hearing would not be preclusive in subsequent actions 
involving the same disputed claims under the same patent.  The nature of the 
Markman proceeding is such that finality is its aim.26 
If TM Patents was correct that a Markman ruling is a final determination of 
claim construction, at least at the trial court level, then once settlement occurs, 
the Markman ruling becomes final for all purposes.  By relinquishing any right 
to appeal, the parties effectively waived any argument that the ruling was not 
final, as well as any argument that either party did not have a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the first time. 
 
 19. Id. at 379. 
 20. Id. at 376. 
 21. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 377. 
 25. Id. 
 26. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
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B. Graco 
The Graco court also considered the preclusive effect of a prior Markman 
ruling in a case that settled.27  The Markman ruling in the prior case was issued 
following briefing and argument, and the case proceeded to trial.  The jury in 
the prior case found that each of the patent claims at issue, as construed by the 
court, had been infringed under the doctrine of equivalents.  However, during 
litigation of the meaning of disputed terms of the claims, the patent holder had 
argued for a broader interpretation of the claims than that adopted by the court.  
The accused infringer appealed and the patent holder filed a protective cross-
appeal, but did not appeal claim construction.  The case settled while the 
appeal was pending. 
In the second case, the patent holder again urged a broad claim 
construction and the accused infringer argued that collateral estoppel barred 
the broader interpretation rejected during the prior Markman claim 
construction.  The issue, as articulated by the Graco court, was whether 
collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the earlier claim construction when the 
patentee could not have appealed the claim construction as of right. 
The Graco court cited the four-part test for determining the propriety of 
collateral estoppel, as enunciated by the Federal Circuit in A.B. Dick Co. v. 
Burroughs Corp.,28 as follows: 
(1) the issue sought to be litigated is identical to one decided in a prior action; 
(2) the issue is actually litigated in the prior action; (3) resolution of the issue 
is essential to a final judgment in the prior action; and (4) the party against 
whom collateral estoppel is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
issue in the first action.29 
Rather than discussing this four-part test explicitly, the Graco court focused on 
two related issues: (1) whether the earlier claim construction had been essential 
to the judgment and (2) whether collateral estoppel could apply when the issue 
sought to be given preclusive effect was not itself appealable as of right.30  
These questions relate to prongs three and four of the collateral estoppel 
inquiry, respectively. 
The Graco court found, as to the first issue, that issue preclusion does not 
apply unless the claim construction was “the reason for the loss” in the prior 
case.31  Because Graco did not lose in the prior litigation, the Graco court 
 
 27. Graco Children’s Products, Inc. v. Regalo Int’l, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 661 (E.D. Pa. 
1999). 
 28. 713 F.2d 700, 702 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 29. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 662.  This test is essentially the same as that used by the TM 
Patents court, although the statement of the third prong of the test in Graco differs slightly from 
the TM Patents recitation of that prong. 
 30. Id. at 664. 
 31. Id. (citing In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
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reasoned that the earlier court’s claim construction was “not essential to the 
final judgment in that case.”32  On the second issue, concerning whether the 
prior claim construction was itself appealable, the Graco court found that it 
was not.33  Graco prevailed in the first infringement suit.  Thus, even though 
Graco may have lost on the issue of claim construction, it could not have 
separately appealed this issue without this independent right to appeal claim 
construction, the Graco court held, and Graco was free to relitigate claim 
construction against a new defendant.34  To support its conclusion, the Graco 
court relied on the Federal Circuit’s pre-Markman decision in Jackson Jordan, 
Inc. v. Plasser American Corp.35  Jackson Jordan held that collateral estoppel 
does not apply against a patentee that prevailed on the issue of infringement in 
a first action despite a narrow claim construction.36  Graco, like Jackson 
Jordan, cited section 28(1) of the Restatement of Judgments,37 which provides 
that issue preclusion does not apply when the party against whom collateral 
estoppel is invoked “could not, as a matter of law have obtained review of the 
judgment in the initial action.”38 
The Graco court was unpersuaded by the fact that, in the prior case, the 
infringer had appealed, and the patent holder had cross-appealed, but had 
declined specifically to appeal the issue of claim construction.39  The court 
refused to look beyond the fact that Graco could not have appealed claim 
construction by itself in the first action.40 
Finally, although the Graco court recognized that “uniformity in the 
treatment of a given patent” was one of the paramount reasons cited by the 
Supreme Court in Markman to support treating claim construction as an issue 
of law for the court, it found that this goal was insufficient to overcome what it 
perceived were precedential limitations to the application of collateral 
estoppel.41 
C. TM Patents and Graco Compared 
Although the TM Patents and Graco courts reach different results, the first 
question is whether the different postures of the original actions merited these 
different results.  The critical difference between the two cases is that in TM 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 665.  Accord Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Electric Corp., No. 
7:99CV00308, 2001 WL 732012 (W.D. Va. July 29, 2001). 
 35. 747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 36. Id. 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982). 
 38. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663–64; Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at 1576. 
 39. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 664–65. 
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Patents settlement occurred before the jury reached a verdict, while in Graco 
the settlement occurred after a verdict of infringement and during appeal. 
As noted, the Graco decision turned on the court’s finding that because the 
patent holder had no right to appeal an overly narrow claim construction, 
collateral estoppel did not apply.  Although not cited, there is Third Circuit law 
that supports the proposition that collateral estoppel does not apply when the 
party against whom estoppel is asserted has no right to appeal the judgment in 
the original action.42  The Federal Circuit’s decision in Jackson Jordan is in 
accord.43 
Arguably, the Graco court misapplied the general rule that collateral 
estoppel does not apply against a party that could not have appealed the issue 
to be precluded.  In Graco, the infringer appealed the judgment of 
infringement and the patent holder cross-appealed.  While the patent holder did 
not expressly appeal the issue of claim construction, it could have.  Moreover, 
the issue of claim construction was in fact before the Federal Circuit as claim 
construction is a necessary component of the infringement analysis.  When the 
Federal Circuit reviews a judgment of infringement, it always reviews the trial 
court’s claim construction.  As the Federal Circuit recently explained: 
Analysis of patent infringement starts with “construction” of the claim, 
whereby the court establishes the scope and limits of the claim, interprets any 
technical or other terms whose meaning is at issue, and thereby defines the 
claim with greater precision than had the patentee. . . . On appeal the Federal 
Circuit is required to construe the claim de novo; thus we do so without 
deference to the rulings of the trial court.44 
Thus, to preclude collateral estoppel when an appeal has been taken would 
seem to put form over substance, at least on the facts of Graco. 
If claim construction issues were within the purview of appellate review, 
then the issue is whether the parties waived their rights to appellate review.  As 
a general rule, when an appeal is mooted by settlement, the parties seeking 
review have “forfeited [their] legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal 
and certiorari . . . .”45  The issues decided by the trial court are, in this instance, 
final, and relitigation of the same issues is foreclosed.46 
 
 42. See, e.g., Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 234 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding issue 
preclusion does not attach if the party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of 
law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action). 
 43. Jackson Jordan Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 44. Pall Corp. v. Hemasure Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 45. Philips Elects. N. Am. Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 96-1426, 1997 WL 652399 
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (denying vacatur when appeal mooted by 
settlement). 
 46. Wellons, Inc. v. T.E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1989) (collateral estoppel 
applies when the issue has been fully adjudicated, regardless of a subsequent settlement). 
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The more important question may be, however, whether the policies 
enunciated in the Markman decision itself are sufficient to merit a fresh look at 
collateral estoppel when a Markman ruling has construed the terms of a patent.  
The TM Patents court found that the policy goals relied upon by the Supreme 
Court in Markman—promoting uniformity in claim construction and public 
notice of the scope of patent claims—required such a fresh look. 
The Markman ruling at issue for collateral estoppel purposes in TM 
Patents was the only arguably final ruling in the case.  No judgment was issued 
because the parties settled during the trial.  Thus, there was no prevailing party.  
This is significant because collateral estoppel is generally used, as it was in 
Blonder-Tongue, against the party that loses in the original action.  It is the 
loser that has the right to appeal.  However, when there is only a Markman 
ruling at issue for collateral estoppel purposes in a prior action because of 
settlement, the issue of who won or lost should not arise.  Both parties waived 
their rights of appeal.47 
The TM Patents court did not address the issue of whether the patent 
holder against whom estoppel was asserted had won or lost its claim 
construction position in the earlier suit.  The court focused instead on the 
finality of the Markman ruling.  If the ruling was final, it could be used for 
collateral estoppel purposes, period. 
This approach seems sensible enough on the facts of TM Patents because 
the parties settled before a judgment could be reached.  The TM Patents court 
assumed that the claim construction could have been appealed “but for” the 
settlement.  It therefore relied on both parties’ relinquishment of appeal rights 
to bar the argument that there was no right of appeal. 
In Graco, the court knew who won the ultimate judgment—the patent 
holder—despite a narrower than requested claim construction.  Thus, the 
Graco decision faced directly the issue that the patent holder had no 
independent right of appeal.  While the court could have decided the issue as in 
TM Patents, based upon the waiver of appeal by settlement, it did not.  The 
court relied on pre-Markman collateral estoppel precedent rather than 
undertaking a thorough review of whether this precedent should apply post-
Markman. 
 
 47. It may also be reasonable to assume that the party against whom collateral estoppel is 
sought to be imposed has in some sense lost on the issue of claim construction.  Moreover, this 
fact would generally be apparent from the Markman ruling itself, when a patent holder’s 
advocated construction is not wholly adopted in the ruling.  As the Federal Circuit has 
recognized, a patent holder can lose on its position in claim construction, but win on the issue of 
infringement.  Jackson Jordan, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1577-1578 (“[A] party can be said to have ‘lost’ 
if it urged a broad scope of the claim, and the court upheld validity on a narrower interpretation”).  
The Federal Circuit in Jackson Jordan held that there is no collateral estoppel in this instance 
because the issue was not appealable.  Id. at 1578. 
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The Graco Court also found that the Markman ruling in the first case was 
not essential to the final judgment in that case because the patent holder 
prevailed.  This is wrong as a matter of law.  Claim construction is always 
essential to final judgment of infringement, no matter whether the patent 
holder loses or prevails.  As the TM Patents court aptly reasoned on this score, 
the claim construction issues actually litigated are those essential to the parties’ 
dispute.48 
In sum, TM Patents is the better reasoned opinion.  The opinion balances 
the practical realities of the Markman ruling process in infringement litigation 
with the traditional elements of a collateral estoppel analysis.  The opinion also 
gives due regard for the policies and purpose of Markman claim construction 
as set forth in the Supreme Court’s Markman decision.  The Graco opinion, on 
the other hand, takes an unduly restrictive view of the Blonder-Tongue test.  
Graco’s superficial analysis ignores the fact that claim construction is always 
reviewed by the Federal Circuit in its review of a judgment of infringement, 
and misapprehends the impact of settlement.  The Markman ruling at issue in 
Graco should have been accorded preclusive effect for this reason and the 
reasons set forth in TM Patents. 
III.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
If the Federal Circuit is to take a fresh look at the collateral estoppel effect 
of Markman rulings, as it may soon be asked to do if either TM Patents or 
Graco is appealed, it must be convinced that it can do so based upon its own 
and other precedents, and that it should do so based upon sound patent policy.  
These issues are explored in the next two sections. 
For a Markman ruling to be granted preclusive effect under the four-part 
test most frequently used by the Federal Circuit and set forth here for 
reference, the issues are: 
 
(1) whether claim construction issues in the second suit are identical to 
those decided in the first action; 
(2) whether the claim construction subject to estoppel was actually litigated 
in the first action; 
(3) whether the claim construction issues decided in the first action were 
essential to final judgment in the first action; and 
(4) whether the party against whom estoppel is asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate in the prior court proceeding the issue he seeks 
to relitigate in the second action.49 
 
 48. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 49. While this four-part test is the similar in most respects to the tests employed by other 
circuits, it is not identical.  See, e.g., Security People, Inc. v. Medeco Security Locks, Inc., 59 F. 
Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465-67 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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A. Whether Claim Construction Issues Are Identical to Those Decided in the 
First Action 
When the claims construed in the first action are the same as those 
construed in the second action, the inquiry of whether claim construction 
issues are identical, for purposes of collateral estoppel, is straightforward.  The 
court applying collateral estoppel need only look to the terms of the claims 
construed in both actions to determine whether the issues presented are the 
same.50  This was not an issue in either TM Patents or Graco. 
The issue of identicality of previously litigated issues arises most 
frequently when the first action concerns claim construction of the original 
patent, and the second action concerns a reissue patent or one that has been re-
examined.  The issue of identicality also arises when a parent patent is the 
subject of the first suit, and a continuation patent is the subject of the second. 
In Gould v. Mossinghoff, the issue was whether the Patent and Trade 
Office (PTO) had properly rejected continuation patent claims because the 
patentee had lost an earlier interference based upon his failure to adequately 
disclose his claimed invention.51  The PTO argued that because the patent 
holder, Gould, had lost two interference proceedings based on findings that he 
had inadequately disclosed the claimed inventions, he should be estopped from 
asserting that a later continuation application adequately disclosed the covered 
invention.  The continuation could be construed to cover the invention that had 
been determined in the earlier interference to be inadequately disclosed.52 
The district court agreed with the PTO that the interference collaterally 
estopped the patentee’s argument that it had adequately disclosed the invention 
claimed in the continuation application.  Although the continuation application 
claimed an invention not previously litigated in the interference, the 
continuation could also be construed to cover the invention that the PTO had 
found to be inadequately disclosed in the interference. 
The court of appeals denied collateral estoppel effect because the 
continuation application claimed an invention which was adequately disclosed 
in the parent application.  The court found that it was immaterial that the 
claims in the continuation application also covered an invention that had been 
 
 50. See Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hilgraeve Corp. 
v. Symantec Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 850, 854 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding the proper construction 
of claims 1 and 18 is the identical issue previously adjudicated). 
 51. Gould v. Mossinghoff, 711 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 52. Id. at 399.  During the PTO’s examination of the continuation application, the examiner 
refused to issue the patent because the claimed invention was inadequately disclosed.  The 
examiner did not assert collateral estoppel based on the earlier interference proceedings.  The 
PTO, however, argued collateral estoppel on appeal to the district court. 
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inadequately disclosed in the parent patent.53  The court explained that “a claim 
can be sustained even if it covers other inoperative or inadequately disclosed 
forms of the invention.”54  Thus, the court looked “to the claimed invention as 
the measure of issue identity.”55  The appeals court did not find that the 
claimed invention was patentable, but rather remanded the ultimate issue to the 
district court to consider without the benefit of collateral estoppel.  The court 
limited its holding as follows: “We simply hold that findings made in 
proceedings involving inventions different from the invention presently 
claimed do not conclusively bar [the patent applicant] from attempting to prove 
entitlement to [the filing date of the parent application].”56 
The Federal Circuit also took a similar “claims level” approach in 
Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil.57  In that case, a federal district court had 
found the claims of the original patent invalid for obviousness.  The patentee 
sought and obtained a reissue patent and sued the same accused infringer on 
the reissue patent.  The accused infringer asserted collateral estoppel based 
upon the earlier invalidity decision.  To apply collateral estoppel in this 
context, the district court compared the original and reissue claims and then 
applied prior art only to the differences between these claims.  The district 
court agreed that collateral estoppel applied, to the extent that the original and 
reissue claims were the same, and found the reissue claims invalid for 
obviousness. 
The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s approach of applying prior 
art only to the differences between an original and reissue claim, requiring 
instead an obviousness analysis on the entire reissue claim as a whole.  Thus, 
at least in the obviousness context, it appears that the determination of whether 
an original claim and a reissue claim raises substantially identical issues cannot 
be determined by a comparison of the differences between the claims.  If the 
claims differ at all, then the reissue claim must be evaluated without regard to 
collateral estoppel.  As the Federal Circuit stated: 
The issue here on appeal is the validity of the claims of the reissue patent, an 
issue that did not exist at the time of the decision on validity of the ‘282 patent 
claims.  There is no estoppel against appellate review of all aspects pertinent to 
the decision on the reissue claims.58 
 
 53. Id. at 400. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Gould, 711 F.2d at 400. 
 57. 774 F.2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 58. Id. at 1136; accord MSM Invs. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Cal. 
1999) (holding collateral estoppel does not apply where differences in claim scope between 
claims of two related patents raise potentially determinative issues that have not been previously 
adjudicated when claims in earlier litigation were found anticipated). 
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In a post-Markman case, Foster v. Hallco Manufacturing Co.,59 the 
Federal Circuit addressed whether a district court’s claim construction in a first 
action precluded relitigation of the meaning of the same language in a second 
action on the reissue patent.  The district court in the second action found that 
collateral estoppel did not apply.  Although the original patent and the reissue 
patent used similar claim language, the court found that the reissue patent 
contained a more specific definition of the disputed claim term than the 
original patent.60  The Federal Circuit held that collateral estoppel was properly 
denied because the issues in the two actions were not identical. 
What is interesting about the Foster case is not its holding but rather the 
fact that it was the patentee that was advocating issue preclusion based upon 
the claim construction from the first action.  Moreover, the patentee advocated 
issue preclusion even though it lost the first action, as several of the original 
claims were found invalid in that action.  The patentee argued to the Federal 
Circuit that the second district court had erred by not adopting the “fixed” 
claim interpretation which had been adopted by the trial court in the first 
action.61  Because the Federal Circuit found that the issues in the two actions 
were not identical, it did not reach the issue of whether Markman “requires that 
the first claim construction of a patent litigated to final judgment is the ‘fixed’ 
claim construction for that patent.”62  The Federal Circuit gave no indication of 
how it would have ruled had it reached this issue. 
While these cases in no way indicate that the Federal Circuit will apply an 
overly restrictive “issue identicality” standard in the claim construction 
context, other cases indicate that the Federal Circuit will have to divorce itself 
from pre-Markman statements that claim construction depends in some fashion 
on the nature of the accused device. 
The Federal Circuit’s philosophy, as articulated in its more frequently cited 
cases on the subject, is that claim construction depends in some way upon the 
particular accused device at issue.  In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,63 the 
Federal Circuit summarized its position on collateral estoppel in the 
infringement context as follows: “[J]udicial statements regarding the scope of 
patent claims are hypothetical insofar as they purport to resolve the question of 
whether . . . products not before the court would . . . infringe the patent 
claims.”64 
 
 59. No. 96-1399, 1997 WL 419391 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 1997). 
 60. Id. at *4. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 5 F.3d 514 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 64. Id. at 517 (quoting A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 
1983)). 
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And, in the same vein: “A device not previously before the court, and 
shown to differ from those structures previously litigated, requires 
determination on its own facts.”65 
The origin of these statements is the Federal Circuit’s decision in A.B. Dick 
Co. v. Burroughs Corp.66  In A.B. Dick Co., the Federal Circuit considered 
collateral estoppel of a prior claim construction decided in a declaratory 
judgment action.  The accused infringer, the declaratory judgment plaintiff, 
raised issues of invalidity and noninfringement.  The declaratory judgment 
court construed certain patent claims and held that the patent was “limited in 
scope to oscillographic recording.”67  The question in A.B. Dick was whether 
this statement collaterally estopped the patentee in a later infringement action.  
In the later action, the trial court granted summary judgment to the accused 
infringer on the basis of this statement.  The Federal Circuit reversed, finding 
that the statement was not necessary to the final judgment in the first case.  The 
Federal Circuit went further, however, arguably displaying the court’s general 
discomfort with collateral estoppel.  The accused product at issue in the 
declaratory judgment action and the accused product before the Federal Circuit 
in A.B. Dick functioned quite differently, but neither was an “oscillograph.”68  
Notwithstanding this similarity and the earlier court’s judgment that the patent 
did not cover “oscillographic equipment,” the Federal Circuit stated: 
Except in the context of validity or infringement, judicial statements regarding 
the scope of patent claims are hypothetical insofar as they purport to resolve 
the question of whether prior art or products not before the court would, 
respectively, anticipate or infringe the patent claims.  Regardless of whether 
the Mead court had jurisdiction to rule on the abstract scope of patent claims, 
we are persuaded that it would be unfair to give such a ruling collateral 
estoppel effect.69 
The Federal Circuit’s statements in A.B. Dick and its progeny limiting the 
preclusive effect of claim construction in a later action because the later action 
involved a different product may have been supportable on pragmatic grounds 
pre-Markman.  Pre-Markman, issues of claim construction and infringement 
were both decided by the fact finder, and were thus intertwined.  This is not the 
case post-Markman.  A determination of infringement today involves a two-
step process in every sense: first, the patent claims must be given their proper 
legal construction, and only then can the properly construed claims be 
compared to the accused device.70  Since Markman, the first step is decided by 
 
 65. Id. (quoting Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1324 
(Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 66. 713 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 67. Id. at 702. 
 68. Id. at 703. 
 69. Id. at 704. 
 70. ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 539-40 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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the court as a final matter, and the second step is performed by the fact finder, 
most typically the jury.  Moreover, the first step is performed without regard to 
the accused device.71 
B. Whether the Claim Construction Subject to Estoppel was Actually 
Litigated in the First Action 
As the TM Patents court found, in the context of a Markman claim 
construction ruling, the issue of whether claim construction was actually 
litigated in a prior action is subsumed by the issue of finality, meaning, 
whether the determination of claim construction was litigated in a manner 
sufficiently final for collateral estoppel purposes.72  Thus, the TM Patents court 
assumed that the Markman hearing in the first action was sufficient to satisfy 
the “actually litigated” requirement as long as the claim construction ruling 
was final and no opportunity to relitigate claim construction existed in the first 
action.73  The Federal Circuit has provided consistent guidance on the “actually 
litigated” requirement. 
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of what constitutes actual litigation 
of a claim construction issue in prior litigation in In re Freeman.74  In that case 
the district court in the first action construed the meaning of a critical term and 
found no infringement based upon that construction.75  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed, finding that the district court’s construction of the critical term was 
not erroneous.76  The patentee then sought re-examination in an attempt to 
redefine the critical term so as to avoid the district court’s construction.  The 
PTO examiner rejected certain claims of the re-examination application on the 
ground that these claims impermissibly sought to broaden the claim in a re-
examination proceeding.77  The patentee appealed the rejection to the Board.  
The Board did not agree with the interpretation of the reissue claims by the 
district court in the first action but nevertheless affirmed the examiner because 
“it found itself to be ‘constrained to accept the court’s interpretation of the 
claim language of the reissue claims.’”78  The patentee then appealed to the 
Federal Circuit. 
 
 71. PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 72. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 73. Id.  The Graco court did not question that the claim construction at issue had been 
actually litigated in the first action but denied collateral estoppel effect because the patentee had 
no right to appeal that construction.  Graco Children’s Products, Inc. v. Regalo Int’l., LLC, 77 F. 
Supp. 2d 660, 664 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 74. 30 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 75. Id. at 1462. 
 76. Id. at 1463. 
 77. Id. at 1461. 
 78. Id. at 1464. 
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The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Board was bound 
by the district court’s interpretation of the claim language at issue in the re-
examination.79  The Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he underlying rationale of 
the doctrine of issue preclusion is that a party who has litigated an issue and 
lost should be bound by that decision and cannot demand that the issue be 
decided over again,” and after finding that the same claim language was at 
issue before the district court and the examiner on re-examination, the Federal 
Circuit reached the issue of whether the issue had been “actually decided.”80 
The Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he requirement that the issue have been 
actually decided is generally satisfied if the parties to the original action 
disputed the issue and the trier of fact decided it.”81  The court found that the 
claim language at issue in the re-examination had been disputed by the parties 
before the district court, and that, in fact, “most of the trial involved 
interpreting this [language].”82  The district court resolved the meaning of this 
language and did so in favor of the accused infringer.83 
If as found in Freeman, “actually litigated” in a claim construction context 
means “disputed” and “decided” at the trial court level, then all Markman 
rulings would necessarily reflect that the claim construction issues addressed 
were “actually litigated.”  Thus, as TM Patents found, the “actually litigated” 
requirement will generally be subsumed by the finality requirement.  The only 
issue arising in the context of a Markman ruling should be whether the claim 
construction issues decided in a Markman ruling are sufficiently final to be 
granted preclusive effect. 
C. Whether Claim Construction Issues Decided in the First Action Were 
Essential to Final Judgment in the First Action 
Under Federal Circuit cases, the requirement that collateral estoppel apply 
only to issues that were essential to a final judgment would seem to imply two 
concepts: essentiality and finality.84  In the context of Markman ruling 
collateral estoppel, these concepts arguably merge. The TM Patents court 
found that Markman rulings are always essential to a final judgment because 
parties litigate only those claim construction issues that are relevant to the 
merits of their claims and defenses.85  Thus, the claim construction issues 
 
 79. Freeman, 30 F.3d at 1465. 
 80. Id. at 1466. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. This issue of finality also arises in answering the last question of the collateral estoppel 
inquiry: whether the issue to be precluded was fully and fairly litigated the first time, discussed 
infra Section III.D. 
 85. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (“the Court limits itself to construing that which is 
necessary to the resolution of the questions of infringement and validity”). 
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litigated are by definition “essential” to any final judgment.  There is much 
more to be said, however, on the issue of finality. 
In virtually every case where the Federal Circuit has granted preclusive 
effect to an issue decided in a previous case, the prior issue was the subject of a 
final appealable judgment.86  The Federal Circuit has denied preclusive effect 
to a final interlocutory ruling when it has not been certified for appeal.87  Thus, 
under the Federal Circuit’s current case law, the court would not grant 
preclusive effect to a Markman ruling in a later case where the first case settled 
before a final judgment was entered.  As the TM Patents court pointed out, this 
is contrary to Judge Friendly’s seminal Second Circuit opinion in Lummus and 
decisions in other circuits that have reached the issue.  Most courts hold that an 
issue that has been fully adjudicated and decided by a final interlocutory order 
is entitled to preclusive effect.88  When the parties settle following the court’s 
entry of a final interlocutory order, an even stronger case can be made.89  
Parties that settle willingly relinquish their rights to appeal.90  The parties 
voluntarily relinquished their right to have the interlocutory order become final 
and appealable.91 
The Supreme Court in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall 
Partnership92 embraced this concept when it held that lower court judgments 
should not be vacated when the parties settle while an appeal is pending, 
 
 86. See, e.g., Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  There are 
arguably two exceptions.  In Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the 
Federal Circuit granted preclusive effect to a final ruling on patent invalidity even though a 
stipulated judgment had been entered following settlement. The Federal Circuit held that the 
invalidity judgment precluded relitigation of this issue because the loser voluntarily relinquished 
his right of appeal.  The second case, Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999), is discussed infra text accompanying notes 118-126. 
 87. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  There, the Federal Circuit held 
that collateral estoppel applies, and “[f]inality should attach for claim preclusion purposes at the 
time of entry of judgment” despite an unresolved motion for JMOL/new trial.  Id. at 1381.  The 
Federal Circuit went on to say, however, the if the judgment was reversed, the district court could 
modify its judgment accordingly.  Id. at 1382. 
 88. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-76.  Following Lummus, courts have held that issues 
decided in interlocutory summary judgment orders may have preclusive effect.  See, e.g., 
Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, 512 F. Supp. 330, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); John Morrell & Co. v. 
Local Union 304A, 913 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a jury verdict not immediately 
appealable because damages phase incomplete is preclusive for collateral estoppel purposes); 
Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 1102 (1980) (an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction “will be given 
preclusive effect if it is necessarily based upon a determination that constitutes an insuperable 
obstacle to the plaintiff’s success on the merits.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Wellons, Inc. v. T.E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 90. See Carpenter v. Young, 773 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (plaintiffs waived right of 
review when they settled following summary judgment). 
 91. Id. 
 92. 513 U.S. 18 (1994). 
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absent exceptional circumstances.93  The Court found that where a court’s 
judgment is mooted by the parties’ voluntary action, it is not in the public 
interest to permit a “secondary remedy of vacatur as a refined form of 
collateral attack on the judgment . . . .”94  Such a collateral attack “would—
quite apart from any considerations of fairness to the parties—disturb the 
orderly operation of the federal judicial system.”95  The Court further noted, in 
often quoted language, that “[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct 
and valuable to the legal community as a whole.  They are not merely the 
property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the 
public interest would be served by a vacatur.”96 
Significantly, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by the argument that 
district court judgments should be vacated more readily than appellate 
decisions “since district-court judgments are subject to review as of right.”97  
The Court rejected this argument, stating that it is inappropriate to vacate a 
judgment “on the basis of assumptions about the merits.”98 
The Bonner Mall case supports the argument that a final Markman claim 
construction ruling should not be erased simply because the parties have 
settled.  If the ruling is a final determination of the meaning of a patent claim 
by the district court, the fact that it is interlocutory should not be decisive.  The 
TM Patents court essentially found just this.  If a Markman ruling is final for 
all purposes at the district court level, it is every bit as final as a final 
judgment.  As the TM Patents court explained: 
After Markman, with its requirement that the Court construe the patent for the 
jury as a matter of law, it is inconceivable that a fully-litigated determination 
after a first Markman hearing would not be preclusive in subsequent actions 
 
 93. Id. at 29. 
 94. Id. at 26. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (citation omitted). 
 97. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 28.  It seems well settled that the correctness of a judgment is 
not at issue when determining the preclusive effect of that judgment unless the error is so 
egregious as to amount to a failure of the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate an issue.  
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971); Bates v. Union 
Oil Co. of Cal., 944 F.2d 647, 651 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1005 (1992) (not unfair 
to apply collateral estoppel even though the judgment may not be free of legal error).  Although 
the Federal Circuit acknowledged this rule in Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 170 F.3d at 1380, it 
expressly reserved for the district court the opportunity to modify its reliance on collateral 
estoppel if there was a reversal in the prior action.  Id. at 1382. 
 98. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added); see also Federated Dep’t Stores v. 
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) (an unappealed judgment is entitled to preclusive effect regardless of 
whether it was wrongly decided). 
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involving the same disputed claims under the same patent.  The nature of the 
Markman proceeding is such that finality is its aim.99 
A recent case, Security People Inc. v. Medeco Security Locks, Inc.,100 
explores the distinction between “finality” for issue preclusion purposes and 
finality for purposes of appeal.  In that case, the court held that an interlocutory 
summary judgment order deciding claim construction and infringement issues 
should be final for collateral estoppel purposes.  The court found that “[a] 
disposition by summary judgment is a decision on the merits, and it is as final 
and conclusive as a judgment after trial.”101 
As the Security People court explained: 
to be ‘final’ for collateral estoppel purposes, a decision need not possess 
‘finality’ in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Instead, a final judgment for 
purposes of collateral estoppel is any prior adjudication of an issue in another 
action that is determined to be ‘sufficiently final’ to be accorded preclusive 
effect.102 
The factors for determining whether a decision is sufficiently firm to be 
accorded preclusive effect are: “(1) whether the decision was not avowedly 
tentative, (2) whether the parties were fully heard, (3) whether the court 
supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, and (4) whether the decision 
was subject to an appeal.”103  Under these factors, an independent Markman 
ruling or a Markman ruling made within the context of a summary judgment 
order should be considered sufficiently final for collateral estoppel purposes, at 
least when the parties have settled under the circumstances of either the 
TM Patents or Graco cases.  The first three factors are satisfied in virtually 
every Markman ruling.  The fourth factor, whether the decision was subject to 
appeal, would present the only open issue.  In cases like TM Patents and 
Graco, where the parties have settled, this factor has been met.  When the 
parties have settled they elect the point at which finality attaches.  Settling 
parties have, by definition, forfeited any right of appeal.  When the parties 
have not settled, and thus waived their right to appellate review, moreover, 
issue preclusion would arguably still be appropriate. 
 
 99. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  The TM 
Patents court relied upon United States v. McGann, 951 F. Supp. 372, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“Lummus has been consistently followed by every circuit which has had occasion to address the 
issue” (citations omitted)).  See also Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999) (adverse discovery orders not vacated where intensely litigated and should be part of the 
developing decisional law in this area). 
 100. 59 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 101. Id. at 1045. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id.  Note that under this test, whether the decision is subject to appeal is only one factor, 
and thus alone is not necessarily decisive. 
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As the Lummus and TM Patents courts held, the issue of finality for 
collateral estoppel purposes properly focuses upon whether the issue decided 
in the first case was considered final for purposes of that litigation.  If one 
imposes the additional finality inquiry concerning whether the decision was 
subject to appeal, the issue is whether a final interlocutory order is appealable.  
While most interlocutory orders are not subject to appeal as of right, an 
interlocutory Markman ruling, like a summary judgment order, may be 
appealed if a district court certifies the issue for appeal sua sponte, or upon 
request of a party.104  A Markman ruling, therefore, is subject to appeal as a 
final interlocutory order, at least in theory.  Practically, however, the Federal 
Circuit has consistently refused to review interlocutory Markman rulings.105  
The Federal Circuit’s practice does not square with the policies of Markman, 
and the Federal Circuit’s own recognition that claim construction is usually 
dispositive of the patent holder’s claim of infringement.106  The practice of 
refusing to review interlocutory Markman rulings does not serve the interest of 
judicial economy.107 
The Federal Circuit’s reluctance to review interlocutory Markman rulings, 
however, should not determine the issue of finality.  If a circuit court’s policy 
on denying interlocutory appeals was decisive, no interlocutory order would be 
considered final for purposes of collateral estoppel.  This, of course, is not the 
law in most circuits.  As noted earlier, finality is more properly viewed as 
finality from the point of view of the trial court.  If the trial court views an 
interlocutory decision as final, it should be viewed as final for purposes of 
 
 104. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), (c)(1) (1994). 
 105. See, e.g., Arthrocare Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 555, 1998 WL 568690 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 
20, 1998); Microchip Tech., Inc. v. Scenix Semiconductor, Inc., Nos. 558, 559, 1998 WL 743923 
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 1998).  It should be noted in this regard that the Federal Circuit could change 
its current policy of declining to review Markman rulings prior to final judgment on the merits.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a prevailing party on the merits may appeal an 
adverse collateral ruling if it retains a stake in the controversy.  Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. 
Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).  Such collateral rulings are appealable after final judgment.  Id. at 
334.  It would certainly seem that a patent holder who loses on claim construction, but wins on 
infringement, retains a sufficient stake in the controversy concerning the proper scope of his 
patent rights.  If he is sufficiently aggrieved, he may appeal.  This avenue would dispose of the 
Graco court’s concern (and the Federal Circuit’s concern in pre-Markman decisions) that a patent 
holder that loses in the Markman ruling, but prevails on the merits, has no right of appeal. 
 106. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 
1997), holding abrogated by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 107. The Federal Circuit’s summary denials of Markman ruling appeals do not explain the 
reasons for the denial.  Judge Newman’s concurring opinion in Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1478-81, 
suggests that the Federal Circuit prefers to review claim construction in a fully developed record.  
However, the Federal Circuit routinely reviews claim construction on appeals from preliminary 
injunctions without a fully developed record.  See, e.g., Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy–
Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND MARKMAN RULINGS 1171 
collateral estoppel.108  The Markman court’s policy justification for treating 
claim construction as an issue of law for the courts—to promote uniformity 
and public notice functions—would also appear to support treating Markman 
claim construction as a “final” interpretation of claims even when the 
Markman ruling is interlocutory.  This interlocutory finality would also accord 
with the majority view of finality under Lummus. 
Although the Federal Circuit has flirted with the notion that an order need 
not be appealable to be accorded finality for collateral estoppel purposes, it has 
not held that collateral estoppel applies to any such interlocutory order.  Judge 
Newman recognized in Interconnect Planning109 that a prior decision need not 
be final in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 pertaining to the appealability of final 
orders, but that the prior adjudication, if “sufficiently firm,” may be accorded 
conclusive effect.110  She then went on, however, to hold that an interlocutory 
order of patent invalidity was not entitled to preclusive effect because the court 
failed to direct entry of final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b).111  This distinction is unsound, however, as Rule 54(b) is to 
the same effect as 28 U.S.C. § 1291.112 
In sum, the TM Patents and Security Peoples approach to finality best 
reflects the policies of Markman and the majority view that finality does not 
require a final appealable judgment, as long as the patentee has had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate claim construction issues, as discussed below. 
D. Whether the Party Against Whom Estoppel Is Asserted Had A Full and 
Fair Opportunity to Litigate In the Prior Court Proceeding 
In the TM Patents case there was no doubt that the parties had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate claim construction issues before the first district 
court.  All parties were given the opportunity to brief the issues fully and the 
court held a hearing and received testimony before issuing its Markman 
ruling.113  In Graco, whether the parties had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate claim construction at the district court level was not an issue except to 
 
 108. The court in Allen-Bradley Co., L.L.C. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316, 320 (E.D. 
Wisc. 2001), refused to vacate its Markman claim construction following settlement, noting that 
the law on the preclusive effect of its Markman ruling is unsettled, but that the court’s claim 
construction “serves a valuable systemic purpose” and “might be of some yet undefined 
assistance to other judges and litigants in the future.”  Id. 
 109. Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 110. Id. at 1135. 
 111. Id. at 1135-36. 
 112. Security People, Inc. v. Medeco Security Locks, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (N.D. 
Cal. 1999). 
 113. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 376-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
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the extent that the patentee had the “opportunity or incentive to appeal.”114  
This issue arose because the patentee apparently lost on the issue of claim 
construction but won on the issue of infringement.115  The court was troubled 
that in these circumstances the patentee could not appeal the Markman ruling 
as of right.  Relying on pre–Markman Federal Circuit case law, the Graco 
court declined to permit an accused infringer to bind the patentee to the claim 
construction decided in the prior case.  The TM Patents court considered the 
same case law but found it inconsistent with Markman and rejected it for this 
reason.116 
Setting aside the correctness of the Graco holding, the Graco case raises 
the important issue of whether a patent holder should be bound by a Markman 
ruling in a subsequent case, regardless of the outcome of the earlier case.  If the 
patent holder loses the first case, there is clearly a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate, as the patent holder has a right to appeal and to seek correction of any 
error.  When the patent holder loses on claim construction in the first case—
where the court rejects the claim construction advocated by the patentee—is it 
fair nevertheless to bind the patentee holder to the first claim construction in 
later cases.117 
Two Federal Circuit cases inform this inquiry.  First, in Pharmacia & 
Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,118 the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
district court’s grant of collateral estoppel on the issue of a patent’s invalidity 
and unenforceability as by a jury verdict in a prior case.  At the time collateral 
estoppel was applied, however, the jury’s verdict in the first case was the 
subject of a pending JMOL/new trial motion.  There was thus no final 
appealable judgment, and the patentee had no right of appeal at that point.  The 
Federal Circuit held that “the district court did not err in applying collateral 
estoppel.  Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, shields a 
defendant from having to litigate issues that have been fully and fairly tried in 
a previous action and decided adversely to a party.”119 
 
 114. Graco Children’s Products, Inc. v. Regalo Int’l., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (E.D. Pa. 
1999). 
 115. Id. 
 116. TM Patents, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 378-79. 
 117. It is important to distinguish that this was not the issue in Graco.  In Graco, an appeal 
was taken on the first case and the parties settled before the Federal Circuit ruled on the appeal.  
When an appeal is taken on the issue of infringement, the Federal Circuit reviews claim 
construction de novo as part of the two step test for infringement.  Infringement cannot be 
determined except on properly construed claims.  Thus, the issue of claim construction was 
before the court in Graco and will always be before the court in any appeal.  Thus, the Graco 
court should have decided the application of collateral estoppel on the same reasoning as the TM 
Patents court.  Upon settlement, both parties to the appeal voluntarily relinquished their rights to 
review. 
 118. 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 119. Id. at 1379. 
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The Federal Circuit noted that the district court qualified its holding “by 
stating that a judgment of invalidity will have no collateral estoppel effect if 
the patentee can show that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate.”120  Thus, it appears that the district court at the very least invited the 
patentee to show that it had not been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the first time.121  The patentee pressed one such argument before the Federal 
Circuit.  It argued that the jury in the first case “failed to grasp the subject 
matter” of the invention.122  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding 
that the first court’s “comprehensive Opinion and Order . . . leaves no question 
that, as a matter of law, Upjohn was in fact accorded a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate.”123 
The Federal Circuit went further, however, finding that “our role is limited 
to reviewing the district court’s application of collateral estoppel, not the 
correctness of the jury verdict in [the first case].”124  The Federal Circuit 
explained: 
Under Blonder-Tongue, a district court’s inquiry into whether the plaintiff was 
afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate is quite narrow and does not 
involve a judgment on the merits: it is clear from the case law that has 
developed since Blonder-Tongue that an inappropriate inquiry is whether the 
prior finding of invalidity was correct; instead, the court is only to decide 
whether the patentee had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of 
his patent in the prior unsuccessful suit.125 
The Federal Circuit’s opinion suggests, appropriately, that it is the district 
court that decides whether the application of collateral estoppel is proper, and 
it is the district court that should undertake the inquiry concerning whether the 
patentee was accorded a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first case.126 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1380. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 170 F.3d at 1380. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (citation omitted). 
 126. A case decided shortly after Blonder-Tongue illustrates the correct analysis.  In 
Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit was faced 
with two prior decisions concerning the validity of the same patent.  The first decided case 
(district court) found the patent valid.  The second decided case (on appeal), but actually the first 
case filed, found the patent invalid.  The accused infringer in a third action invoked collateral 
estoppel based upon the earlier determination of invalidity.  The Fifth Circuit upheld collateral 
estoppel noting that contrary decisions in the first decided case did not create an exception to 
Blonder-Tongue collateral estoppel.  Id. at 548.  The question of the ultimate merits of the 
invalidity decision was not itself at issue.  Rather, the issue was whether the patentee had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate.  The contrary decisions simply signaled that the court considering 
estoppel should carefully apply the “full and fair criteria.”  Id. at 548-49.  The prior contrary 
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Under Blonder-Tongue, this inquiry is quite substantive, as it is meant to 
be a “safeguard” against the improvident use of collateral estoppel.127  Before 
collateral estoppel applies, the patentee (or party against whom estoppel is 
asserted) “must be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that he did not have a 
fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially to pursue his 
claim the first time.”128 
The Supreme Court mentioned several factors that come into play in 
determining whether a patentee had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
first time.  In addition to whether the patentee litigated in his chosen forum, 
and had an incentive to fully litigate, a court may consider: (a) whether the first 
court made the pertinent legal inquiries; (b) whether opinions filed in the first 
case (including a reviewing court’s opinion, if any) indicates whether the prior 
case was one of those rare instances where the courts failed to grasp the 
technical subject matter and issues in suit; and (c) whether without fault of his 
own the patentee was deprived of crucial evidence or witnesses in the first 
litigation.129 
In the claim construction context, a court considering collateral estoppel 
can readily make these inquiries.  The court will have before it the written 
record supporting a first court’s claim construction, comprised generally of 
briefs, affidavits, hearing transcripts, and a written opinion considering the 
record and construing the claims.130  Given the fact that a second court will 
have the tools at hand to determine whether a patentee was accorded a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate claim construction matters, there would seem to be 
no justification for not permitting a second court, whether a trial court or the 
Federal Circuit, from allowing the collateral estoppel effect of a Markman 
ruling after a Blonder-Tongue inquiry.  If interlocutory orders that reflect a trial 
court’s final decision on the matter may be accorded preclusive effect on the 
issues decided—which is the majority rule—then a Markman ruling likewise 
should be permitted preclusive effect if there was a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate. 
The closest the Federal Circuit has come to granting preclusive effect to an 
issue considered final by the trial court is the court’s recent holding in 
Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.131  In Pharmacia, 
the court held that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of an earlier invalidity 
 
decision did not “undermine the numerous policy reasons expounded in Blonder-Tongue in favor 
of applying estoppel.”  Id. at 549. 
 127. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971). 
 128. Id. at 333. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(applying Blonder–Tongue factors when deciding collateral estoppel effect of earlier invalidity 
judgment). 
 131. 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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judgment even though that judgment was, at the time, the subject of post-trial 
motions and a subsequent appeal.  The Federal Circuit found that the patentee 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of validity, as evidenced by 
the first trial court’s “comprehensive Opinion and Order.”132  The possibility of 
an appeal does not rob the judgment of its collateral estoppel effect.133  The 
Federal Circuit also noted that “the law is well settled that the pendency of an 
appeal has no effect on the finality or binding effect of a trial court’s 
holding.”134  Thus, under Pharmacia, a trial court’s judgment has preclusive 
effect from the point at which it is entered despite pending pretrial motions, the 
possibility of appeal or the pendency of an appeal. 
The final Federal Circuit case of note is Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Independent 
Living Aids, Inc.135  In that case, the patentee sued accused infringer A in a first 
action. The Federal Circuit reversed the first trial court twice, in 
nonprecedential opinions, on claim construction of both the original patent and 
then a reissue patent.  The patentee then sued accused infringer B on the 
reissue patent and the second trial court granted collateral estoppel on claim 
construction based on the first trial court’s construction of the reissue patent.  
On appeal of the second trial court’s decision of non-infringement, the Federal 
Circuit held that its nonprecedential opinion rule, Fed. Cir. R. 47.6(b), “does 
not unconditionally prohibit citation of nonprecedential opinions but instead 
permits citation of such opinions for limited purposes.”136  Relying on 
Markman, the court continued: “[i]n this case, the interest of consistency in the 
construction of patent claims would be ill served by interpreting Rule 47.6(b) 
to preclude consideration of a prior claim construction rendered as a matter of 
law by this court.”137  While the Federal Circuit did not use the term collateral 
estoppel, its decision clearly employs this doctrine with regard to its earlier 
claim construction opinion.138  In construing claim one of the reissue patent, 
the Federal Circuit noted “this court previously construed the term ‘floor pan’ 
in Burke II.”139  The Federal Circuit then adopted this construction against the 
accused infringer in the second case, despite the fact that the accused infringer 
had never litigated the issue in the trial court because the trial court had relied 
upon collateral estoppel.  The Federal Circuit was not reviewing the trial 
court’s claim construction.  Rather, the Federal Circuit simply gave collateral 
estoppel effect to its earlier construction in a case against a different defendant.  
 
 132. Id. at 1380. 
 133. Id. at 1381. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 183 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 136. Id. at 1337. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1341. 
 139. Id. 
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This case suggests that at least when the Federal Circuit has construed a patent 
claim, it views this construction as the proper one for all purposes. 
The Burke and Pharmacia cases, taken together, support an affirmance of 
the TM Patents case and a reversal of the Graco case, should either reach the 
Federal Circuit on the issue of collateral estoppel.  The only issue left open by 
these two cases is the finality of an interlocutory Markman ruling when the 
parties settle.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Bonner Mall suggests that 
settlement imparts finality to an otherwise final Markman ruling, at least on the 
facts of both TM Patents and Graco.  Under Bonner Mall, settlement 
constitutes a waiver of any right of appeal, and the issues finally decided prior 
to settlement should have preclusive effect if the ultimate Blonder-Tongue 
requirement, a full and fair opportunity to litigate the first time, is met. 
IV.  POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Extending the collateral estoppel effect to Markman rulings when the 
parties have settled implicates three sets of interests: those of the litigants, the 
public and third parties.  These interests likewise implicate significant policies: 
protecting patent rights, fostering competition in technologies not protected by 
patents, providing competitors and inventors with notice of the scope of patent 
rights, encouraging settlement and conserving private and judicial resources. 
Patentees would arguably disfavor extending collateral estoppel effect to 
Markman rulings because prior Markman rulings would be asserted against 
them.  Patentees would most often prefer to freely litigate claim construction 
against each new defendant without constraint for several reasons.  First, a 
patentee would prefer to tailor its claim construction arguments to most 
directly capture the accused device at issue.  Second, if a patentee is the 
financially stronger party, the patentee may gain an advantage from forcing an 
accused infringer to expend the substantial sums necessary to litigate claim 
construction.  The patentee is generally more familiar with its patent, has its 
experts in place, and has learned the strengths and weaknesses of its case in 
prior litigation.  An accused infringer, in contrast, must evaluate the claims 
(often with significant time pressures), retain experts, perhaps conduct tests, 
and generally focus its corporate and legal resources on the critical task of 
claim construction. 
A patentee would also prefer to evaluate the merits of settling its first 
infringement suit without regard to the potential collateral estoppel effect of a 
Markman ruling.  A patentee would argue that its incentive to settle based 
upon the merits and economics of a particular case would be distorted if the 
patentee must also consider the collateral estoppel effect of a Markman ruling.  
An accused infringer might well agree if the patentee’s willingness to settle 
was negatively influenced by the potential collateral estoppel effect of the 
Markman ruling. 
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Future accused infringers—third parties to the Markman ruling at issue—
would favor a broad application of collateral estoppel to prior Markman 
rulings.  If the prior Markman ruling was advantageous to the accused 
infringer, the accused infringer would assert collateral estoppel.  If the prior 
Markman ruling was not advantageous, the accused infringer would be free to 
argue it was in error if the patentee raised the Markman ruling in support of its 
proposed claim construction.140 
The accused infringer in the second action would also favor collateral 
estoppel because of the significant cost advantages.  By relying upon the 
earlier Markman ruling, the accused infringer could greatly reduce his defense 
costs, permitting him to focus upon a comparison of the accused device to the 
earlier claim construction and other defenses.  Moreover, the duration of the 
case would be shortened and the opportunity for an early summary judgment 
ruling enhanced if a second Markman ruling could be avoided.  The accused 
infringer would also argue that the likelihood of settlement would increase as 
most if not all claim construction issues would have been determined, and thus 
the respective strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case would be evident 
earlier in the case. 
Between these opposing interests lies the public interest.  Patent policy 
favors the protection of patent rights.  While patents are presumed valid, 
however, no such presumption attaches to claim construction.  Rather, the 
public interest favors a clear delineation of the scope of the patent grant, and 
claim construction advances this interest.  Thus, it would seem that if a 
patentee has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate claim 
construction, the public interest would be served by adhering to that claim 
construction so as to put competitors and inventors practicing in the same field 
of art on notice of the legitimate scope of patent rights and thus the inventions 
from which they are foreclosed.  Such notice would also arguably encourage 
competitors to seek a license rather than risk litigation, thus protecting the 
patentee’s legitimate interests. 
The public interest is also served by a rule that conserves private and 
judicial resources as long as the rule does not unfairly burden other interests.  
The modulating principle here, again, is that parties must be given a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate their claims.  It is through this safeguard that the 
public can gain confidence that the protection of patent rights and notice of the 
scope of those rights remain paramount interests. 
The public interest in fostering settlement is arguably premised most 
basically upon the conservation of private and judicial resources.  Private and 
judicial resources are used most efficiently when directed to disputes that the 
 
 140. To the extent that a patentee found an earlier claim construction advantageous, it would 
cite the earlier Markman ruling for its persuasive effect. 
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parties cannot themselves resolve.  A policy favoring settlement therefore 
encourages the most efficient use of judicial and private resources. 
Lastly, the public interest favors finality.  Like other policy interests, the 
interest in finality must balance the interest of the efficient use of private and 
judicial resources with the interest in according litigants the opportunity to 
fully and fairly litigate their claims.  When litigants have been accorded such a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate, a second bite at the same claims is not 
warranted.  A policy of finality encourages litigants to use the judicial system 
efficiently to determine their respective rights and obligations based upon the 
expectation that finality is the goal.  This expectation of finality discourages 
plaintiffs from bringing strategic or weak cases and encourages an early 
settlement of cases that for some reason do not merit full advocacy.  Full and 
fair advocacy also serves the social utility of judicial decision-making and 
results in decisions that can be relied upon by third parties. 
The Supreme Court has examined these interests in two significant cases 
that bear on the application of collateral estoppel to Markman rulings when the 
parties have settled: Blonder-Tongue and Bonner Mall.  In Blonder Tongue, the 
Supreme Court held that a patentee whose patent has been held invalid in a 
first action may not relitigate the issue of validity in a second action against a 
different defendant unless the patentee can show that he “did not have a fair 
opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue his claim the 
first time.”141  In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court examined patent 
policy, the economic costs of permitting relitigation of a decided question of 
patent validity, and the burden on the courts of permitting relitigation of a 
previously decided invalidity determination.142 
The Court recognized the congressional purpose of rewarding inventors 
through the patent system and the presumption of validity that attaches to an 
issued patent.143  The Court further acknowledged the complexity of patent 
litigation and the uncertainty that may attach to judicial decisions because of 
the difficult issues often presented in such litigation.144  As the Court aptly 
noted, however, there is no reason to expect that a second district court would 
decide an issue more accurately than the first.145  Nor are most issues related to 
a patent more difficult than issues arising in other areas which are routinely 
decided by the federal courts.146  Finally, as the Court noted, if the patentee is 
the plaintiff in the first action, he chose the time and place to sue, and was 
presumably prepared to litigate to the finish.  The patentee would have every 
 
 141. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971). 
 142. Id. at 330. 
 143. Id. at 331, 335. 
 144. Id. at 331. 
 145. Id. at 331-32. 
 146. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 332. 
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incentive to put before the court in the first action all relevant evidence and 
argument on his claims and defenses.147 
Thus, the Supreme Court found nothing in patent policy, or the nature of 
patent litigation itself, that would counsel against applying collateral estoppel 
to a patent validity determination.  This same conclusion holds equally for a 
judicial determination of claim construction resulting from a Markman ruling. 
A Markman ruling determines the proper scope of a patent, rather than its 
validity.  Thus, the statutory presumption of validity does not apply.  However, 
like a validity determination, claim construction deals with the proper scope of 
patent protection.  The underlying policy issues are the same as to both 
determinations.  Only a properly construed claim defining the scope of 
invention should be protected by the patent laws.  Competition should be 
restrained only to the extent of a properly construed claim, and the public as 
well as competitors have an interest in testing not only the validity of a patent 
but also its proper scope.148  As the Supreme Court stated in Blonder-Tongue: 
“[t]he patent is a privilege.  But it is a privilege which is conditioned by a 
public purpose.  It results from invention and is limited to the invention which 
it defines.”149 
Establishing the scope of patent claims is clearly in the public interest and 
serves fundamental patent policy.  Thus, a decision on the scope of the patent 
claims at issue in a first suit deserves binding effect to the same extent as a 
decision on invalidity. 
Economic considerations also favor according collateral estoppel effect to 
Markman rulings.  Patent litigation is extraordinarily expensive.150  The costs 
of defending a patent infringement suit can be staggering, especially to a small 
business.151  The cost alone of marshaling a defense creates an incentive to 
settle.  Thus, an accused infringer may find settlement the only practical 
option, even when the merits of the suit are questionable.152  Permitting an 
accused infringer the benefit of a prior claim construction determination would 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 664-67 (1969) (licensees may challenge the validity 
of the licensed invention; competition should not be repressed by worthless patents). 
 149. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 344.  The Supreme Court further emphasized the 
importance of finality of invalidity determinations in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton 
International, 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993).  In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Federal 
Circuit’s routine practice of vacating a district court’s determination on patent invalidity (or 
validity) as moot when the Federal Circuit finds noninfringement was in error.  This practice, the 
Court found, creates a potential for wasteful relitigation and imposes ongoing burdens on 
competitors who are convinced that a patent has correctly been found invalid.  Id. at 100-01.  
Relying upon Blonder-Tongue, the Court also emphasized the importance to the public at large of 
resolving questions of patent validity.  Id. at 100. 
 150. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 334-39. 
 151. Id. at 334. 
 152. Id. at 334-35. 
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greatly reduce the cost of litigation and encourage a decision on the merits.  A 
patentee, likewise, would save the litigation costs associated with relitigating 
claim construction issues.  The time and dollars saved could arguably be 
allocated to a more productive use, such as research and development.153 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court was concerned in Blonder-Tongue 
with the incentive a patentee might have to extract royalties from competitors 
absent collateral estoppel of a previous invalidity determination.154  Some 
alleged infringers would elect to pay royalties to avoid costly litigation even 
when a patent had been declared invalid.  Those accused infringers would be 
placed at a competitive disadvantage compared with those who could afford to 
litigate or who had obtained a judgment of invalidity.155  Consumers would be 
burdened with higher costs for products sold by those companies paying forced 
royalties or engaging in needless litigation challenging a patent already 
declared invalid.156  This reality would also create barriers to entry for new 
firms, especially smaller ones, faced with the prospect of higher entry costs 
that again would ultimately be borne by consumers.157 
These economic considerations apply with equal force to claim 
construction.  If a patent has been construed by a court to grant narrower rights 
than advocated by the patentee, the patentee that seeks through repeated 
litigation to expand his patent rights creates the same potential for market 
distortion and foreclosure as the patentee that seeks to relitigate an invalidity 
determination. 
The Supreme Court considered the final policy issues, balancing the public 
interest in promoting settlement and finality in Bonner Mall.  There, the Court 
brought an end to the appellate court practice of vacating district court 
opinions when the parties settled while an appeal was pending.158  The Court 
held that when parties moot an appeal by settling, they voluntarily relinquish 
any right of appeal and surrender any right to equitable vacatur, except in 
exceptional circumstances.159 
The Supreme Court began its policy analysis in Bonner Mall by noting that 
“[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal 
community as a whole.”160  Thus, the practice of vacating a district court 
decision merely because its appeal is mooted by settlement erases a 
 
 153. Id. at 338. 
 154. Id. at 345-46. 
 155. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 346. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 347. 
 158. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994). 
 159. Id. at 24-26, 28-29. 
 160. Id. at 26 (citing Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 US 
27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The Izumi case presented the same issue decided in 
Bonner Mall, but was dismissed by the Supreme Court on technical grounds. 
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presumptively correct legal precedent and with it the potential collateral 
estoppel effect of issues decided by the district court.161  While the Supreme 
Court did not directly discuss the effect of vacatur on collateral estoppel, it 
noted that “vacatur clears the path for future relitigation of the issues. . .”162  
The court was very much aware of the relationship.  The year before it decided 
Bonner Mall, the Court was presented with virtually the same question decided 
by Bonner Mall, but in a different context: where vacatur denied a plaintiff in 
another case the benefit of collateral estoppel.163 
The Court found it contrary to the public interest to permit the parties to 
obtain vacatur of an otherwise final decision by the district court simply 
because they had waived their right to appeal.  This would amount to a 
“refined form of collateral attack on the judgment” and “disturb the orderly 
operation of the federal judicial system.”164  Commentators have gone farther 
in this regard, arguing strongly that the practice of routine vacatur allows 
disappointed parties to control the direction and content of judicial precedent, 
weeding out the negative precedent and preserving the positive.165  The 
practice threatens the fairness of judicial decision-making by enabling litigants 
with deep pockets who are repeat players on the same issues to purchase 
favorable legal rulings.166  Such litigants can sue new defendants until the 
desired result is reached, expunging through settlement adverse rulings along 
the way.167 
The petitioner in Bonner Mall argued that vacatur was justified because it 
would facilitate settlement.  The Supreme Court was unconvinced.  While the 
Court acknowledged that vacatur might encourage settlement after an appeal 
was filed or certiorari granted, it could deter settlement at an earlier stage.168  
 
 161. Id. at 26-27; U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 55 F.3d 592, 598 (Fed. Cir. 
1995).  But see Bates v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 944 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 
U.S. 1005 (1992) (vacatur alone does not bar preclusive effect of issues decided in vacated 
decision). 
 162. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 22. 
 163. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27 (1993).  
Both the parties and the Court focused in depth upon this issue.  See Appellant’s and 
Respondent’s briefs, 1993 WL 289863; 1993 WL 289867; 1993 WL 625899; Transcript of Oral 
Argument, 1993 WL 757650. 
 164. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 27. 
 165. J. Resnick, Whose Judgment?  Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the 
Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1491-92 
(1994). 
 166. A. Tulumello, Shopping for Legal Precedent Through Settlement-Related Vacatur, 1 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 213 (1994). 
 167. Id. at 220. 
 168. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 27-28. 
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Encouraging settlement at the earliest stages of litigation promises the greatest 
judicial economies.169 
The policy interests considered in Bonner Mall weigh in favor of according 
collateral estoppel effect to Markman rulings when parties settle.  A Markman 
ruling, fully and fairly litigated at the district court level, is a final resolution of 
claim construction.  If the parties settle after this final determination, the 
Markman ruling, like a final judgment, is not reviewable at the parties’ 
election.  Whatever precedential or collateral estoppel effect it may have 
should be determined in the discretion of a later case, and upon a Blonder-
Tongue inquiry, if collateral estoppel is at issue.  The Markman ruling is not 
erased by settlement. 
If the parties to an infringement suit do not wish to risk the future collateral 
estoppel effect of a Markman ruling, they have two options.  First, they may 
settle before a Markman ruling is issued.  Alternatively, they may request that 
the district court vacate the ruling.  The Supreme Court in Bonner Mall 
expressly acknowledged this option.  Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order for good 
cause.170 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This paper argues that both policy and precedent favor extending collateral 
estoppel to Markman rulings under the circumstances presented in both TM 
Patents and Graco.  A more difficult question is presented when the patentee 
prevails in the district court and the parties do not settle and the infringer does 
not appeal.  In these instances, there is arguably no avenue through which the 
patentee can obtain review of the district court’s claim construction.  However, 
if the Federal Circuit changed its current policy of never reviewing an 
interlocutory Markman ruling, an avenue for review would emerge.  
Alternatively, if a patentee loses on claim construction but wins on 
infringement, it could be argued that the Markman ruling in this instance is 
analogous to an invalidity determination.  The patentee has lost the scope of 
patent protection to which he believes he is entitled.  Under the teachings of 
Cardinal Chemical, a patentee might argue that there is a sufficient case or 
controversy to merit an appeal of an adverse Markman ruling.171  Thus, a 
patentee that forgoes the opportunity to appeal either an interlocutory 
Markman ruling or the Markman ruling independently following final 
 
 169. Id. at 28. 
 170. Id. at 29. 
 171. See, e.g., Ashley v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals (In re DES Litigation), 7 F.3d 
20, 23 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding a prevailing party aggrieved by the collateral estoppel effect of a 
district court’s rulings may appeal the rulings if the judgment in the prior action was dependent 
upon those rulings). 
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judgment, should reasonably be bound by that Markman ruling in future 
litigation. 
Whatever the posture of the case that ultimately presents the issue of 
Markman ruling collateral estoppel to the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit 
will be faced with both a challenge and opportunity to offer guidance to all 
district courts.  The Markman ruling follows closely, in terms of importance, to 
a determination of patent invalidity in the lexicon of patent precedent.  The 
question of the collateral estoppel effect of these rulings deserves the same 
attention and invokes the same policy considerations as did the issue of the 
preclusive effect of a prior invalidity determination considered in Blonder-
Tongue.  If the Federal Circuit is to provide the unifying guidance needed in 
this area, it must undertake a more searching analysis than is evident in its 
current precedent.  Arguably, the Federal Circuit must broaden its scope, 
returning to Supreme Court precedent and policy under the guidance of 
Markman, Blonder-Tongue, Bonner Mall, and perhaps Cardinal Chemical.  If 
the Federal Circuit accepts the opportunity to offer its far-reaching guidance, 
either TM Patents or Graco may soon become a seminal case. 
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